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1. Introduction
1 
In a typical defined contribution (DC) pension scheme the investment risk is 
borne entirely by the plan member. This basic characteristic of DC schemes has long 
been acknowledged and underscored both by researchers on social security systems 
and by experts of economic policy authorities.
2 Involving as it does the transfer of 
financial risks from firms or from the public sector to workers, this feature should be a 
concern for government authorities. In fact, sample surveys reveal a low level of 
financial education among consumers, even in countries where pension funds have 
been in existence the longest.
3 It is also likely that exposure to investment risk goes 
some way to explain the low levels of membership and contributions to these schemes 
in a number of countries.
4 
The management of financial investment risks is a rather complex task, even 
for specialized intermediaries. This is because the prices of financial assets are subject 
to what are known as tail risks, in other words to the tendency to generate extreme 
losses with a greater frequency than what “chance” would be expected to generate in 
normal conditions. A clear demonstration of how vulnerable any pension scheme 
based on the accumulation of financial assets is to stock exchange downturns was 
seen in the recent financial crisis. For the United States, for instance, there is evidence 
that in 2008 many 401(k) participants nearing retirement (aged 56–65) had very high 
exposures to equities and suffered large reductions in their account balances (on the 
order of 25 per cent).
5 Somewhat more reassuring is the evidence provided by 
Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai (2009) using data from the Health and Retirement 
Study. Rather low stock market holdings and substantial reliance on defined benefit 
(DB) plans as primary pension are likely to have muted the impact of the financial 
crisis on the wealth of US households in which at least one member is approaching 
retirement. Nevertheless, there is little dispute that future generations of retirees will 
rely on DC plans much more than current generations. Moreover, as Coile and Levine 
(2009) stress, severe financial turbulences are typically associated with weak labour 
markets and if older job seekers have difficulty finding work, they may retire earlier 
than expected (rather than delaying retirement), resulting in lower pension income. 
                                                 
1 We are greatly indebted to Hideki Konishi, Filippo Taddei and Juan Yermo for very helpful 
discussions. We are grateful for useful comments from Henk J. Brouwer, Riccardo Cesari, Nicolas A. 
Cuche-Curti, Antonio Di Cesare, Lorenzo Forni, Maura Francese, Daniele Franco, Andrea Gerali, 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Giuseppe Marotta, Sandro Momigliano, Joana Pereira, Tommaso Perez, Antonio 
Rossetti, Paolo Sestito, Mauricio Soto, Daniele Terlizzese, Anita Tuladhar, Roberto Violi and seminar 
participants at the Bank of Italy, the Center for Advanced Research in Finance of the University of 
Tokyo, the CeRP 10th Anniversary Conference (Collegio Carlo Alberto, Moncalieri) and the 
conference on “Risk Sharing in Defined Contribution Pension Schemes” held at the University of 
Exeter on 7-8 January 2010. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect those of the Bank of Italy. The authors are solely responsible for any errors. 
2 See, for example, Diamond (1977), Bodie (1990), Fornero (1999), Blake (2000), Campbell and 
Feldstein (2001), Orszag and Stiglitz (2001), the Group of Ten (2005) and the Pensions Commission 
(2005). 
3 See OECD (2005), and Lusardi and Mitchell (2007). For an analysis of some of the evidence in Italy, 
see Cesari, Grande and Panetta (2008). 
4 For a discussion of the low level of contributions to pension funds and the high degree of exposure to 
financial risks of members of DC pension funds, see Visco (2009). 
5 See VanDerhei (2009). Changes in account balances reflect not only investment returns but also 
contributions, which increase the rate of accumulation. For cross-country evidence on the impact of the 
crisis on pension funds, see Antolín and Stewart (2009).   6
The objective of avoiding or reducing workers’ exposure to financial risks is 
one of the reasons for the development of mixed pension schemes, such as “hybrid” 
DB funds or DC funds with forms of protection of returns. Moreover, in some 
countries, public authorities provide rate of return guarantees. In the wake of a 
dramatic financial crisis, it is vital to consider whether the forms of protection from 
fluctuations in the prices of financial assets now available to DC plan members can 
actually provide an effective shield against extreme investment risks. This calls for 
greater use of intergenerational risk sharing (Bütler, 2009) and, as with the unresolved 
problem of aggregate longevity risk,
6 possible forms of public intervention (Visco, 
2009). 
This paper assesses the hypothesis of the government providing DC plan 
members with the guarantee of a minimum return. The guarantee would be 
compulsory, but each plan member could choose among different levels of minimum 
return depending on the maximum loss that he or she would be willing to bear. DC 
plan members should pay risk-based premia to a guarantee fund, which would be able 
to prefund its activity. 
Two aspects should be highlighted to place things in proper perspective. First, 
our proposal is not only fully consistent with the private provision of occupational or 
individual funded pension schemes, but is designed to strengthen the DC pillar of 
retirement systems, as it would allow governments not to leave workers alone to deal 
with extreme financial market risks. Second, the advantage of introducing a public 
minimum return guarantee depends critically on the design of the overall retirement 
arrangements; it is less relevant for countries where public pensions represent the bulk 
of retirement income. 
We start by briefly examining the main characteristics of mixed DB pension 
schemes (Section 2) and mixed DC schemes (Section 3). Section 4 presents the 
guarantee mechanism. Section 5 shows some statistics illustrating the long-term 
relationship between GDP growth and trends in financial markets. Then the paper 
analyzes the benefits and risks of the proposed guarantee scheme (Sections 6 and 7, 
respectively). Section 8 addresses the issue of how to determine the market value of 
the guarantee, and Section 9 summarizes the reasons why government intervention 
might be necessary. Section 10 concludes.  
2.  Mixed defined benefit pension schemes 
Several DB pension schemes aim to shelter members from investment risks, 
but establish some relationship between contributions paid in and benefits (a typical 
characteristic of DC funds) in order to favour fund solvency. 
Three notable examples of these mixed pension schemes (also known as 
“hybrid”) are: (1) cash balance plans, which in the past decade have expanded 
significantly in the United States; (2) collective pension schemes in the Netherlands; 
and (3) the centralized DB pension fund proposed in the first half of this decade by 
Franco Modigliani and his co-authors. 
CASH BALANCE PLANS. To all effects and purposes, these are DB schemes, in 
which the investment risk is borne entirely by the pension fund sponsor (typically the 
employer). Like all other defined-benefit plans cash balance plans are guaranteed, 
                                                 
6 See Group of Ten (2005), Visco (2007), and Antolín and Blommestein (2007).   7
within certain limits, by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. What sets them 
apart from the others is the fact that the amount of pension benefits does not depend 
on parameters such as pay or length of service but on two other variables: the 
contributions paid in and a predetermined capitalization rate (which can be fixed or 
variable). In fact, in a cash balance plan, the contributions paid in by the worker 
(directly, or by the employer on his behalf) are capitalized at a previously set rate, 
which in turn can be indexed to another variable (for example, the yield on 1-month 
US Treasury bonds). The benefit the worker receives at retirement will therefore 
depend on the total amount of contributions and this capitalization rate. Members’ 
contributions to cash balance plans are invested on financial markets by the employer; 
it is therefore the employer who is responsible for all the entire investment risk and 
return.
7 
COLLECTIVE PENSION SCHEMES IN THE NETHERLANDS. Dutch collective pension 
schemes have a mechanism of intergenerational risk-sharing. Through a combination 
of increases in contributions and cuts in indexation of pension benefits, funding 
deficits are shared among currently employed people, pensioners and future 
generations. The benefits of this and other mechanisms of intergenerational solidarity 
that characterize Dutch collective pension schemes have to be assessed against the 
costs of restrictions of individual choices and possible labor market distortions.
8 
THE MODEL OF MODIGLIANI ET AL. The model for a pension system proposed by 
Modigliani and his co-authors arose primarily from the concern that workers should 
not be left alone to cope with investment risks.
9 According to the proposal, the 
fulcrum of the retirement system should be a centralized and fully funded scheme, 
that is financed by mandatory contributions and that offers defined benefits 
(contributory funded defined benefit scheme, CFDB scheme). In this system, the 
workers (and their employers) pay in contributions to the fund, which credits them to 
individual accounts. These payments are managed on a collective basis (by 
government or by private intermediaries delegated for this purpose); once a year (or in 
any event periodically), the pension fund effects a swap with the Treasury, whereby 
the earnings accrued in the year through the management of the portfolio are swapped 
with those that would have been generated if the return on the portfolio’s management 
had been equal to a previously determined amount (5 percent, in Modigliani and 
Muralidhar’s proposal of 2004). This swap assures all workers that the contributions 
to the CFDB fund are capitalized at a fixed rate and that the investment risk will be 
borne entirely by government.
10 
                                                 
7 The cash balance accounts differ from typical DB funds in other ways too, such as the procedure for 
paying out the pensions, which in cash balance accounts can take the form of a lump sum rather than an 
annuity.  
8 An example of how a Dutch collective pension fund would deal with a negative asset shock is 
provided by Bonenkamp, van de Ven and Westerhout (2007). For a general discussion of the costs and 
benefits of this type of pension schemes, see van der Lecq and Steenbeek (2007). 
9 See Modigliani, Muralidhar and Ceprini (2000), Modigliani and Muralidhar (2004), and references 
therein. 
10 Another advantage of the CFDB fund is that the pooled management of the contributions of all 
workers reduces the cost of managing the portfolio; also, workers with the same pension contributions 
and similar in all other respects are guaranteed similar rates of return.   8
3.  Defined contribution pension schemes with forms of financial protection 
DC pension funds may offer members either relative rate guarantees or fixed 
rate guarantees.
11 In the case of the former, the guaranteed return is tied to an index. A 
well-known example is Chile, where the guarantee is linked to the average return 
earned by all pension fund management companies. These forms of guarantee 
typically do not provide a hedge against generalized adverse conditions in financial 
markets. Fixed rate guarantees may take the form of a flat rate (such as 2.5 percent per 
year) or a minimum rate. In the case of the flat rate, the DC pension fund becomes a 
mixed DB pension scheme, like a cash balance plan. In what follows, therefore, we 
focus on minimum return guarantees. 
Minimum return guarantees may take three basic forms: (1) they can be based 
on financial market instruments, as where portfolio choices are circumscribed to 
fixed-income securities (in particular those indexed to consumer prices) or derivatives 
options contracts are subscribed; (2) they can be provided by third parties, such as an 
insurance company or the pension fund sponsor; (3) they can be based on a reserve 
fund (at the level of the individual fund or groups of funds) or on other forms of 
mutual risk transfer.
12 The reserve funds, in particular, enable the financial results to 
be spread out over time: in years of high returns part of these are placed in the reserve 
fund, to be drawn on in years when the returns fall below a given threshold. 
It must be stressed that these forms of protection always entail costs, unless the 
pension fund sponsor or another entity provides a subsidy. These costs may take the 
form of fees and premiums (for derivatives and insurance policies) or lower returns 
(when the accumulated amount is invested mainly in low-risk securities with 
intrinsically low returns or when the smoothing of returns over time penalizes some 
cohorts). If these lower net returns are not offset by higher contributions during the 
accumulation phase, they will result in smaller pensions. In other words, lower net 
returns always imply less consumption either during work life or in retirement or 
both. 
Minimum return guarantees based on financial market instruments or on 
mutual assistance schemes have two major drawbacks. First, as mentioned, they may 
entail considerable costs. Second, and more important, they may not be able to insure 
against simultaneous, extreme, systemic shocks to a range of portfolio asset classes. In 
such adverse contingencies, it is very likely that the terms and conditions of the 
guarantees would be renegotiated. 
These concerns are consistent with recent evidence on the functioning of 
minimum return guarantees. Turner and Rajnes (2009) analyze the cases of some 
pension funds in the United States
13 and in some other countries during the last two 
major stock market declines (in 2000-2003 and 2007-2009). They find that guarantee 
schemes in which the minimum return is set at a low rate, such as return of principal, 
seem to be able to withstand adverse financial market conditions. The results differ 
somewhat for minimum return guarantees above the risk-free rate, which tend to be 
expensive and to be maintained through subsidies by the provider. Moreover, over the 
                                                 
11 See Turner and Rajnes (2001, 2003, 2009) and Pennacchi (2002). 
12 The latter case is considered by Boeri, Bovenberg, Coeuré and Roberts (2006). 
13 Funds sponsored by state governments (for instance, Indiana, Louisiana, Montana, Ohio and Oregon) 
or non-profit organizations.   9
last decade expensive minimum return guarantees have often been changed as 
required, possibly by lowering the minimum return, denying the guarantee to new 
members, going over to a flat rate guarantee, or eliminating the guarantee outright. 
4.  A public minimum return guarantee for defined contribution schemes 
How can the government insure participants in a defined contribution pension 
scheme against financial market tail risks, i.e. against very large declines in financial 
asset prices that are very rare but that can drastically reduce the value of a worker’s 
accumulated pension fund assets? One way would be to provide a minimum return 
guarantee that protects future pensioners against any sharp curtailment of the amount 
accumulated. The minimum return should be set at a level that will (1) generate 
expenditure commitments for the government that can be financed from an ad hoc 
fund and that in any case are sustainable and (2) ensure each worker has an acceptable 
pension income in relation to the contributions paid in over his working life and his 
propensity to take investment risks. 
One solution that appears reasonable is to make the guarantee compulsory and 
to offer DC plan members a set of options on the level of minimum return. Moreover, 
DC plan members should pay a risk-based premium for the guarantee, proportional to 
both the volatility of the portfolio and the level of minimum return. 
Three reference choices for the minimum return are as follows: (i) a zero 
percent rate, which would ensure the return of contributions in nominal terms; (ii) the 
inflation rate, which would ensure the return of contributions in real terms; and (iii) 
the nominal growth rate of GDP. The latter choice resembles those adopted in the 
so-called notional pay-as-you-go public pension systems of some countries (for 
instance, Italy and Sweden). 
In order to ensure the sustainability of the public insurance scheme, the 
guaranteed minimum return should not be greater than the nominal growth rate of 
GDP.
14 Minimum returns lower than the nominal GDP growth rate would be feasible, 
as plan members might want to exchange lower levels of coverage for lower premia. 
Therefore, provided that plan members would pay risk-based premia for the 
guarantee, any level of minimum return between nil and the nominal GDP growth rate 
could be appropriate, depending on DC plan members’ willingness to bear investment 
risks. The rest of this section lays out how the government insurance programme 
would work. 
The government would guarantee DC plan participants that upon retirement 
they would receive a final accumulated amount not lower than a “notional” amount 
given by the level that would have been reached if the contributions had been 
capitalized year by year at the guaranteed minimum return (e.g., the nominal growth 
rate of GDP): 
  T T T A G W , max           ( 1 )  
                                                 
14 In case of positive population growth, a minimum return equal to the growth rate of GDP per capita 
would likely ensure the stability of the long-run ratio between the total assets of pension schemes and 
GDP.   10
where  T W  is the final amount to which the pension fund participant is entitled at the 
time of retirement and after T  years of contribution,  T G  is the final amount of the 
notional fund and  T A  the final amount of the pension fund. 
















e e T g w c G         (2) 
where  T  is the number of years of contribution,  p e  is the participant’s age at 
retirement,  a e  is his age at the time of enrolment in the pension fund, e is his current 
age,  e c  is the percentage contribution rate,  e w  is gross earnings and  i g  is the 
guaranteed minimum return in the year in which the participant was i years old.
15 
















e e T w c A           ( 3 )  
where  i   is the average rate of return earned by the DC plan on its portfolio of 
financial assets when the participant was i years old. 
The guarantee, therefore, gives prospective retirees the right to enter into a 
swap of notional funds for pension funds with the government. If the guarantee is 
exercised, it implies a net transfer of resources from the government to the 
prospective retiree equal to the difference between the final amount of the notional 
fund and that of the pension fund: 
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e e T T g w c A G  .   (4) 
In order to pay out this insurance cover, the Treasury could institute a special 
“guarantee fund”, which would finance the operation by running down reserves or by 
issuing government-guaranteed securities. The profits would come from the premiums 
paid by DC plan participants to cover the costs of the guarantee and from income on 
financial operations. 
The transfer of resources from the guarantee fund to the prospective retiree 
could take two different forms, depending on whether or not there is a transfer of 
assets from the pension fund to the guarantee fund:
16 
                                                 
15 As argued above, three possible levels of minimum return are nil, the inflation rate and the nominal 
GDP growth rate. The guarantee might also be applied to only a part of the contributions (for example, 
those paid by the worker or, in the Italian case, the severance pay provisions allocated to the pension 
fund). 
16 The two streams of payments may be either settled separately or netted. If they are netted, only one 
party (in this case, the guarantee fund) makes a payment, the net of the two streams, to the other. See 
Chance (2003).   11
Figure 1 
Stylized financial statements of the guarantee fund 
for defined contribution pension schemes (1) 
 
BALANCE SHEET  
 
Assets  Liabilities and net 
equity 
  
financial assets  government-
guaranteed 
securities 
(deficit) retained  profits 
 
 
(net loss for the 
year) 
net profit for the 






generated by swaps 
premiums paid by 
DC plan members 
interest expense  interest, dividends 
and other proceeds 
on proprietary 
securities 
valuation losses on 
proprietary 
securities  
valuation gains on 
proprietary 
securities 
net profit for the 
year 
(net loss for the 
year)   
 
(1) The items “deficit” and “net loss for the year” appear in parentheses to indicate that they 
are alternative to the items “retained profits” and “net profit for the year”, respectively. 
 
 
-  without transfer of assets, the guarantee fund only pays prospective retirees 
the difference between the final amounts of the notional funds and the 
pension funds (equation 4); 
-  with transfer of assets, the guarantee fund takes over the assets of 
prospective retirees (whose market value is given by equation 3) and pays 
them the full amount of their notional funds (equation 2); in this case the 
reserve fund has to finance much larger outlays and acquires the assets that 
the prospective retirees had accumulated with the pension funds. 
In both cases, the stylized financial statements of the guarantee fund would be 
those presented in Figure 1. The income statement shows, under expenses, the net 
outlays generated by the swaps,
17 interest payments on government securities and 
valuation losses on proprietary securities. Under revenues, it would show premiums 
paid by DC plan participants, income on financial operations and valuation gains on 
the securities portfolio. 
The balance sheet shows the sources of financing of the fund. Payments to 
prospective retirees would be financed by running down reserves or by proceeds from 
issues of government-guaranteed securities. Profits would be generated by the 
                                                 
17 Net outlays are defined as the difference between the notional funds and the market value of the 
assets accumulated into the pension funds, regardless of whether the swap entails a transfer of assets or 
not.   12
build-up of premiums paid by pension plan participants benefiting from the guarantee 
and by investment of those premiums in financial assets, as well as by income and 
capital gains on the financial assets.
18 An assessment of the level of the premiums that 
workers would have to pay is provided in Section 8. 
5.  Long-run growth in GDP and share prices: a comparison 
For the sustainability of the guarantee fund, the most demanding option is a 
minimum return equal to the nominal growth rate of GDP. In that case, the public 
insurance scheme described above has two main factors of risk: the nominal growth 
rate of the economy and the returns of the financial markets. Before examining the 
advantages and costs of this form of guarantee for the workers, as well as the risks for 
the government, let us look at some empirical regularities in the relative performance 
of GDP and financial asset prices. Our analysis of portfolio returns focuses on 
equities, for which long time series are more available. 
Some statistics on the long-run relation between GDP rates and equity returns are 
presented in Table 1. Panel (a) of the table considers data on the United States 
covering 80 years, from 1929 to 2008. For four long time horizons (10, 20, 30 and 40 
years), the table shows the years in which the average growth rate of GDP was higher 
than the average rate of return on equities for at least one of the four horizons. The 
table highlights that, for long time horizons, the cases in which nominal GDP 
outpaces the stock index: 
—  are not very frequent. This happens in 20 of the 70 years for the 10-year horizon, 
11 of 60 for the 20-year horizon and never for the 30- and 40-year horizons (for 
which 50 and 40 observations, respectively, are available);
19 
—  are rarer, the longer the investment horizon; 
—  show some degree of persistence. In the 80 years examined, the cases in which the 
growth rate of GDP exceeds that of share prices are concentrated in two sub-
periods: the years just after the Second World War and the 1970s-early 1980s. 
Panel (b) of the table compares data for 10-year periods starting from 1970 for 
15 countries. The main results are: 
—  the relative performance of GDP and equities shows marked similarity across 
countries. Almost everywhere the GDP growth rate exceeds that of equity prices 
in the 1970s, while the opposite occurs in the two subsequent decades; 
—  for the current decade, the data now available indicate that in all 15 countries the 
equity indices have gained less than GDP, owing to the collapse of the stock 
markets in 2008. 
Broadly similar results (not reported) are obtained from a comparison of GDP 
growth with a portfolio consisting entirely of bonds and with a portfolio divided
                                                 
18 Initially the fund’s reserves will be very low, because workers will have been paying premiums only 
for a short period. In case the guarantee is triggered, the fund will run a deficit. With the passage of 
time, outpayments of notional funds will presumably cease, and, thanks also to income and valuation 
gains on the financial assets acquired with the premiums paid by plan members or with swaps (if there 
is a transfer of assets), the guarantee fund would begin to show a profit and make good the deficits 
(since at a certain point it would also be able to begin set aside reserves). 
19 As the time series begins in 1929, the rates of return on periods of 10, 20, 30 and 40 years are 
available starting from 1939, 1949, 1959 and 1969, respectively.   13
Table 1 
A comparison of long-run growth rates in nominal GDP and equity indexes (1) 
(excess of the growth rate of GDP over that of share prices, in percentage points and on an annual basis) 
Panel (a): Years in which the long-run annual growth rate in nominal GDP exceeded that of the stock price index in the US between 1929 and 2008 (2) 
Year  42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 71  73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 08 
10-year  growth  rates 1.62 6.80 3.38 3.50 6.32 2.06 4.37 2.15 0.17  2.87 6.92 4.77 3.13 6.18 6.04 3.84 2.47 4.97 3.40       6.80 
20-year  growth  rates         0.55     0.01    0.16 1.73 1.45 0.81 2.56 0.87 1.07 1.66 0.95  
3 0 - y e a r   g r o w t h   r a t e s                              
4 0 - y e a r   g r o w t h   r a t e s                              
Panel (b): 15 advanced countries since 1970 (3) 
 Australia  Belgium  Canada Denmark France  Germany Ireland  Italy Japan  Netherlands Spain  Sweden Switzerland UK  US 
GDP [a]                                              
1970-1979 13.0 10.4 12.6 11.7 12.6 7.9 17.6 17.0 12.3 10.7 17.9 11.0 6.2 14.9 9.6 
1980-1989 11.0 6.4 8.6 7.9 9.1 4.9 11.3 13.6 6.1 4.2 12.3 9.9 5.6 9.7 7.6 
1990-2000 5.0 4.2 4.5 4.3 3.5 4.2 10.2 5.7 2.0 5.4 7.2 4.9 2.9 5.6 5.3 
2001-2007 7.1 4.1 5.1 3.8 3.9 2.3 8.5 3.7 0.4 4.4 7.3 4.4 3.0 5.2 4.9 
2001-2008   7.3 3.9 5.0 3.7 3.8 2.4 7.2 3.5 0.1 4.4 6.9 4.2 3.1 4.9 4.7 
1970-2000 9.6 6.9 8.4 7.9 8.2 5.6 12.9 11.8 6.5 6.7 12.2 8.4 4.8 9.9 7.6 
1970-2008 9.1 6.3 7.6 7.0 7.3 4.9 11.7 10.0 5.2 6.2 11.1 7.5 4.5 8.8 7.0 
Equity [b]                                              
1970-1979 5.5  6.6 10.0 9.6 8.3 2.6 13.6 0.7 12.4 5.2 -0.4 6.9 2.5 11.7 6.7 
1980-1989 16.9 19.9 11.7 23.6 22.3 16.8 22.5 25.5 20.5 19.6 28.2 30.7 10.4 22.3 16.1 
1990-2000 10.7 10.2 10.0 10.0 12.1 9.9 14.2 10.3  -6.2 18.0 13.3 15.2 15.6 12.7 14.4 
2001-2007 13.1 8.3 9.0 9.6 4.4 4.7 5.0 3.2 3.0 2.5 10.5 5.3 3.4 4.7 1.5 
2001-2008 5.4 -2.7  3.0 0.2 -2.6 -2.1 -8.5 -4.8 -3.8 -7.3 3.5 -1.6 -2.1 -0.5 -4.7 
1970-2000 10.8 12.0 10.5 14.0 14.0 9.5 16.4 11.4  7.8 14.0 12.7 17.0 9.4 15.2 12.3 
1970-2008 9.7 8.8 8.9 11.0 10.4 7.0 10.8 7.9 5.3 9.3 10.7 12.9 6.9 11.8 8.6 
GDP vs. equity [a-b]                                             
1970-1979 7.5 3.8 2.6 2.1 4.3 5.3 4.0 16.3  -0.1 5.5 18.3 4.1 3.7 3.2 2.9 
1980-1989 -5.9 -13.5  -3.1 -15.7 -13.2 -11.9 -11.2 -11.9 -14.4 -15.4 -15.9 -20.8 -4.8 -12.6 -8.5 
1990-2000 -5.7 -6.0 -5.5 -5.7 -8.6 -5.7 -4.0 -4.6  8.2 -12.6 -6.1 -10.3 -12.7 -7.1 -9.1 
2001-2007 -6.0 -4.2 -3.9 -5.8 -0.5 -2.4 3.5 0.5 -2.6 1.9 -3.2 -0.9 -0.4 0.4 3.4 
2001-2008   1.9 6.7 2.0 3.5 6.4 4.5 15.6 8.3 4.0 11.7 3.4 5.8 5.2 5.3 9.4 
1970-2000 -1.2 -5.1 -2.1 -6.1 -5.8 -3.9 -3.5 0.4 -1.3 -7.3 -0.5 -8.6 -4.6 -5.3 -4.7 
1970-2008 -0.6 -2.5 -1.3 -4.0 -3.1 -2.1 0.9 2.1 -0.2 -3.1 0.3 -5.4 -2.5 -3.0 -1.6 
Sources: Based on Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bloomberg, OECD.Stat (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx), Thomson Financial Datastream, Shiller (2005) and Dimson, 
Marsh and Staunton (2002). 
(1) Equity indexes all incorporate reinvested dividends. – (2) Dashed vertical lines mark discontinuities in the sequence of years. – (3) Equity returns are only available for 
10-year periods starting from 1970. For Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland and the UK, GDP growth rates are available since 1971.   14
equally between equities and bonds (the comparison is limited to the three sub-periods 
1970-79, 1980-89 and 1990-2000). 
Summing up, this section provides some evidence on the risk that over long-
term horizons financial market returns turn out to be lower than the nominal growth 
rate of GDP. On the basis of past experience and available statistics, that risk has two 
main characteristics: (i) it is relatively low and tends to diminish as the investment 
horizon lengthens; (ii) it is, however, also poorly diversifiable, as it is highly 
concentrated in time and tends to affect many geographical areas simultaneously. 
6.  The advantages for the worker of a government-guaranteed minimum return 
In the insurance scheme presented in Section 4, the guarantee would be 
compulsory, but plan members could opt among different levels of minimum return, 
ranging from zero to the nominal GDP growth rate. Such a guarantee scheme would 
offer several advantages to DC plan members. 
In the first place, the contributions of each member during his working life 
would be capitalized at a rate that is at least equal to the level consistent with the 
maximum amount of risk that the worker is willing to bear (e.g., a rate that provides a 
final balance not lower than cumulative contributions adjusted for consumer price 
inflation). In this sense, a noteworthy case is a minimum return equal to nominal GDP 
growth, where for amounts saved under the DC plan during the accumulation period 
workers would not be exposed to inflation shocks or real shocks affecting single 
industries or groups of workers and would also be sheltered from the risk of becoming 
poorer in relation to the rest of the economy. A nominal GDP guarantee would also 
provide cover against protracted periods of unsatisfactory financial market returns 
(like the 1940s or 1970s), when the diversification of investments over financial asset 
classes and geographical areas does not significantly reduce risks (see Section 5). 
Second, for workers, DC plans with a government-guaranteed minimum return 
would be better than either mixed DB plans or DC plans with financial protection (see 
Sections 2 and 3, respectively). Compared with mixed DB plans, DC schemes with a 
guaranteed minimum return give members the chance to benefit when the financial 
markets are performing well. If, at the end of the savings period, the return on the 
pension fund is greater than the accumulated growth of nominal GDP, the worker has 
the right to the sum accrued in the pension fund, whereas mixed DB plans have a pre-
determined capitalization rate for the contributions, and any surplus financial market 
returns go to the entities providing the guarantee.
20 Compared with DC plans with 
investment risk protection based on financial market instruments or on mutual 
assistance schemes, a publicly guaranteed minimum return may be less costly and 
more effective in addressing extreme financial risks (see also Section 9). 
Lastly, the guarantee scheme presented in this paper would have the advantage 
of maintaining a high degree of flexibility in DC retirement schemes, above all in 
                                                 
20 The asymmetry of returns received by members of DC plans with a guaranteed minimum return (i.e. 
the fact that they benefit from positive trends in the financial markets without being exposed to the risk 
of falling asset prices) creates the risk of opportunistic behaviour by DC plan members. This is 
discussed in the next section.   15
terms of differentiating accumulation plans according to members’ risk preferences 
and to different options for disbursing pension benefits.
21 
It must be made very clear that all these advantages would not be free. As we 
mentioned in Section 4, workers should pay a fee that takes account both of the 
riskiness of the portfolio and of the level of the minimum return (for an estimate of 
the market value of such a fee, see Section 8). This implies that the advantage of a 
public minimum return guarantee for defined contribution pension scheme members 
depends critically on the broader retirement system, and specifically on the relative 
size of defined contribution schemes within that system, the riskiness of the other 
components, whether enrollment in private DC schemes is mandatory or voluntary, 
and the standards of pension fund investment regulation. Therefore, possible 
applications of the guarantee scheme set out in this paper would have to be adapted to 
the specific characteristics of the arrangements applying in any one jurisdiction. It 
should also be pointed out that the variability of the cost of the guarantee implies that 
the guarantees that are more valuable are also those less affordable for low-income 
workers.  
It is also worth noting that the guarantee would only apply to the accumulation 
phase, leaving open the question of how to deal with longevity and other risks and 
ensure that retirement wealth is properly decumulated.
22 In order to shield workers 
from investment and longevity risks during the payout phase, the minimum return 
guarantee should be combined with other options, such as postponing retirement or 
purchasing deferred annuities. 
The guarantee might apply to both mandatory and voluntary DC pension 
schemes. Workers who voluntarily join a DC pension scheme and have a high 
propensity to take financial risks might always choose the 0 percent minimum return 
guarantee, in order to keep insurance premia as low as possible. 
Another issue relates to the length of the contribution period. Since the latter is 
not known in advance, at least in voluntary systems, it could be possible to introduce a 
default length of the guarantee depending on the age of the worker at enrolment. That 
should be coupled with an additional charge if the worker exits earlier or a rebate if he 
remains in the fund longer. 
Finally, the introduction of a compulsory choice among different levels of 
guaranteed minimum return might add a further layer of complexity to decisions 
about retirement, which typically turn out to be very difficult for workers. This fact 
might call for the introduction of a default option in the guarantee scheme. Any 
default option for the guarantee should be coordinated with possible default options 
for the portfolio. If there is no default option for the portfolio, the default guarantee 
could be a guarantee of repayment of contributions paid in in real terms (e.g., a 2.5 
per cent guarantee). If there is a default option for the investment line, the default 
guarantee would depend on the latter. If the default portfolio were very low-risk, then 
                                                 
21 This insurance scheme may be compared to the innovative retirement system proposed by Kotlikoff 
(2008). Kotlikoff advocates replacing mixed retirement systems (including public and private pensions) 
with a personal account system characterized by: (1) compulsory contributions (with government 
matching contributions for the poor); (2) compulsory annuitization in real terms at retirement; (3) 
collective investment in a global, market-weighted index fund of stocks and bonds, subject to a 
guarantee of at least a zero real return on one's cumulative contributions. 
22 On these issues see, e.g., Fornero and Luciano (2004), Visco (2007, 2009) and Guazzarotti and 
Tommasino (2008).   16
the default guarantee should be the 0 percent rate. If the default portfolio were a 
balanced portfolio, the default level of the guaranteed minimum return could be 
higher. 
7.  The risks of a guarantee fund 
A guarantee fund exposes the government to two risks in particular: the 
uncertain sustainability of the insurance scheme and the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour by the insured. Specific problems also arise in relation to the transition 
period and the governance of the guarantee fund. The discussion that follows focuses 
on a minimum return equal to the nominal growth rate of GDP, which implies the 
largest expected outlays for the guarantee fund. 
SUSTAINABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT GUARANTEE SCHEME.  As regards the 
sustainability of the insurance scheme,
23 the first risk factor is financial market trends: 
the greater the volatility of the return on the pension fund portfolio, the greater the 
likelihood that the guarantee will be triggered and the greater the government’s 
potential outlay. The second risk factor is the rate of GDP growth, which has direct 
and indirect effects working through the growth in gross earnings. The higher the rate 
of GDP growth, the higher the probability that the guarantee will be triggered and, in 
that case, the larger the net outlays of the guarantee fund.
24 
In order to assess the sustainability of the government guarantee scheme, it is 
worth observing that, in the long term, the returns on financial assets tend to be at 
least equal to the nominal rate of growth of the economy (see the evidence in Section 
5). Moreover, as a government-backed entity, the guarantee fund would be able to 
finance the swaps with prospective retirees by issuing very long-term bonds at low 
interest rates. 
A broad indication of how long it takes for the guarantee fund to recover the 
net outlays originated by the swaps can be gained from long time series on the United 
States. As we saw in Panel (a) of Table 1 in Section 5, over the period 1929-2008 
there were some years in which, for accumulation periods of 10 and 20 years, nominal 
GDP outpaced the stock market. Those years are considered in Figure 2, which 
shows, for each of the two investment horizons, the distribution of the number of 
years it took for the share price index to regain the level of nominal GDP after the 
swap was executed.
25 The estimated recovery periods do not exceed 6 and 3 years for 
the 10- and 20-year horizons, respectively. If one also takes into account possible 
funding costs incurred by the guarantee fund (proxied by the annual nominal growth
                                                 
23 The guarantee fund’s outlay produced by the swap with pension fund members would be positively 
correlated with three variables (see equation 4 above): (i) the rate of GDP growth; (ii) gross earnings; 
and (iii) the percentage contribution rate. It would be negatively correlated with: (iv) the return on the 
DC plan. In the event the swaps were to be funded by issuing state-backed securities, the overall cost of 
the guarantee would also be affected by the rate of interest on these securities. 
24 The size of the outlays is also affected by the contribution rates: even a variation of just a few tenths 
of a percentage point may have a significant impact, if applied to the entire amount of annual earnings. 
25 The indicator shown in Figure 2 does not take into account contributions, which have an impact on 
the time to recovery, while it does take into account very few cases of a second drop of the share price 
index below the value of the guarantee. With respect to the cases shown in Panel (a) of Table 1, the 
left-hand panel of Figure 2 does not include 2008, for which post-shock returns are not yet available.   17
Figure 2 
Indicator of the time to recover net outlays of swaps (1) 
 

























































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 recovery of the net outlay that had to be funded when the swap was executed
recovery of the net outlay, if the latter is capitalized year by year at the nominal growth rate in GDP
 
Sources: Based on Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bloomberg data. 
(1) Data refer to the United States and cover 80 years, from 1929 to 2008. The two panels relate to 10-year or 
20-year accumulation periods and show the distribution of the number of years after the swap in which the share 
price index was below the value it should have had in order for the guarantee not to be exercised. Two different 
hypotheses are made on the amount that has to be recovered: only the net outlay at the time of the swap and the 
net outlay capitalized year by year at the nominal growth rate of GDP. 
 
rate of GDP), the recovery period naturally lengthens, reaching a maximum of 14 and 
7 years for the 10- and 20-year horizons, respectively.
26 
The indicator reported in Figure 2 suggests that the time that is necessary to 
recover the net outlays of the swap is quite variable: it may be as short as one year, 
but it may also be as long as three years or more. This variability is a very serious risk 
for workers nearing retirement age, who may not be able or willing to postpone 
retirement for an indefinite number of years. But that uncertainty could be quite easily 
managed by the public guarantee fund, which would be a government-backed 
intermediary with a long-term investment horizon and able to issue very long-term 
bonds economically. 
It will be helpful to estimate the outlays that the guarantee fund would have 
sustained over the last two decades if an insurance scheme of the kind proposed in this 
paper had been in place. The last two decades represent a tough test for such a fund. 
As shown in Section 5, in 2008 the financial crisis made nominal GDP outpace equity 
indexes over long-term investment horizons for the first time since the early eighties. 
Another period of dismal performance of stock markets in all advanced economies 
was right at the turn of the century, due to the bursting of the high-tech bubble. The 
last two decades also cover the most challenging test one can think of, that of the 
Japanese stock market. Since the major crash that occurred in 1990, share price 
indices in Japan have not yet fully recovered their end-1989 level and even in the 
middle of ’00s (before the last crisis) they were still considerably lower than that 
level. 
                                                 
26 If funding costs are proxied by the interest rate on long-term US government bonds (data drawn from 
Shiller, 2005), the maximum length of the recovery period is equal to 9 and 8 years for the 10- and 
20-year horizons, respectively.   18
Figure 3 shows some estimates of the maximum outlays of the guarantee fund 
for the United States and Japan (Appendix A details the assumptions underlying the 
calculations), positing that the guarantee fund settles the net amount due in cash 
(equation 4), with no transfer of assets. The calculations provide an upper bound, as 
they are based on an extremely unfavourable hypothesis: all workers who retired in a 
given year had enrolled into a DC pension plan fully invested in equities and had 
made the worst choice as to the year of enrolment. For instance, with the benefit of 
hindsight, for a US worker who retired in 2008 the worst choice would have been to 
join a DC plan in 1996 and keep the money invested in an equity portfolio throughout 
the 13-year accumulation period. Figure 3 shows that if all US workers retiring in 
2008 had made that choice, the estimated outlay for the guarantee fund would have 
amounted to 0.4-0.5 percent of 2009 GDP. For Japanese workers retiring in 2008 the 
worst choice would have been to join a DC plan in 1983 and hold a domestic equity 
portfolio for 26 years. If all Japanese workers retiring in 2008 had made that choice, 
in that year the guarantee fund would have transferred to prospective retirees a net 
amount of resources equal to about 0.7 percent of 2009 GDP. Note that these 
estimates assume that each year all prospective retirees were enrolled in a DC pension 
plan. This is an extreme assumption. In the United States, for instance, in 2008 only 
one senior worker out of two was enrolled in a DC plan (either occupational or 
individual; see Copeland, 2008). 
Overall, the estimates reported in Figure 3 indicate that in worst-case scenarios 
the annual swap outlays of the guarantee fund might be as high as 0.7 percent of GDP. 
Figure 3 also shows an estimate of the cumulative annual interest expenses of the 
guarantee fund had it funded the maximum swap outlays by issuing 10-year 
government-backed bonds. Over the last two decades, the overall interest expenses 
would have amounted to 0.05 percent of the 2009 GDP in Japan and 0.03 percent in 
the United States. 
The calculations shown in Figure 3 indicate that the swap outlays of the 
guarantee fund would likely be concentrated during periods of cyclical downturns and 
prolonged decline in stock market indices. This highlights the importance of 
prefunding the swaps by accumulating reserves. Prefunding would also shield the 
insurance scheme from political pressures. 
If there were also a transfer of assets from the pension schemes to the 
guarantee fund, the swap outlays would be much larger and the guarantee fund would 
likely have higher leverage, i.e. a higher level of debt for given reserves. Higher 
leverage might allow the guarantee fund to more quickly recoup swap outlays. On the 
other hand, the transfer of assets would make the management of the swaps more 
complex and would increase both the solvency risk of the guarantee fund and other 
possible disadvantages entailed by size (e.g., the risk of suggestions to use reserves 
for purposes different from that of providing the guarantee). 
In any case, the guarantee fund’s size compared with the size of the main 
investment markets should be monitored to make sure that financial asset prices are 
not excessively influenced by the fund’s portfolio choices. Figure 4 compares the total 
assets of pension funds with the size of the domestic bond and equity markets in three 
countries where retirement saving schemes have long been developed. While it would 
be necessary to take into account the geographical diversification of pension fund 
holdings, this simple comparison suggests that the guarantee fund may get large 
enough to have a substantial price impact on some financial assets.   19
Figure 3 
Estimate of the maximum outlays of the guarantee fund for the United States 
and Japan if the minimum return guarantee scheme had been in place (1) 
(as a percent of the GDP of the following year) 
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Sources: Based on national data and Bloomberg, OECD, Shiller (2005) and Thomson Datastream data. 
(1) For each country, estimate of the maximum annual outlays (and cumulated interest expenses) of the 
guarantee fund had the minimum return guarantee scheme been in place (as a percent of the GDP of the year 
following the one shown on the horizontal axis). It is assumed that the guarantee fund settles the net amount due 
in cash with no transfer of assets. The maximum outlays are estimated under the extremely unfavourable 
assumption that, in each year, all workers who retired in that year: (i) had previously joined a DC pension plan, 
kept their balances invested in 100 percent domestic equity portfolios and opted for a nominal GDP guarantee; 
(ii) had all joined the plans in the worst year in terms of the return of the stock market index relative to nominal 
GDP over the accumulation period. For each year in which there are outlays of the guarantee fund, the graph 
also reports the hypothetical year in which that cohort of new retirees joined the plans and the length of the 
accumulation period in years. The annual contribution rate is set equal to 12 percent and the annual number of 
new retirees is estimated on the basis of the number of workers who were 60-64 years old. Due to data 
availability, the counterfactual analysis is carried out for any possible accumulation period starting from the 
early nineties for the United States and the early eighties for Japan. For a description of the data, see Appendix 
A. 
 
THE TRANSITION PERIOD. The countercyclicality of swap net outlays calls for 
special attention during the transition period. It would be better to limit the size of 
interventions until the guarantee fund had built up a certain level of reserves. That 
could be done by establishing that the guarantee only applies to accumulation periods 
longer than a certain number of years (say, fifteen), to be shortened gradually as 
premia accrue. The time of activation of the guarantee might also be varied depending 
on the riskiness of the portfolio and the level of the guarantee. 
RISKS OF OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOUR BY THE INSURED OR THE ASSET MANAGER. 
The existence of a government-guaranteed minimum return could encourage DC plan 
members to over-expose themselves to financial risks. This risk could be a significant 
one especially for workers who, as they near retirement, are dissatisfied with the 
results achieved by their pension fund. A return guarantee might also affect the 
incentives of portfolio managers. Opportunistic portfolio choices could be 
discouraged in several ways. First, the guarantee scheme should be made compulsory, 
especially if members have to pay regular premiums. Second, the guarantee might be 
applied only if the period of participation in the DC scheme is longer than some 
threshold duration (say, ten years). These two conditions would reduce adverse 
selection effects. Third, a ceiling on the percentage of risky securities in a pension 
fund’s portfolio could be set. Fourth, the allocation of securities within a portfolio   20
Figure 4 
Pension fund holdings compared with the size of domestic market, 2005 
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could be required to have an individual “life cycle”; that is, as retirement approaches, 
the portfolio would be redistributed away from risky securities to safer assets (e.g. 
from shares to government securities). Fifth, other prudential criteria could be 
tightened, such as those meant to ensure the diversification of risk within the portfolio 
and the quality of eligible portfolio assets. Finally, following Lachance and Mitchell 
(2003a, 2003b), the minimum return guarantee could be applied to a predefined 
standard portfolio (e.g. monetary, balanced, growth), rather than to the portfolio 
actually held by the prospective retiree. In brief, risks of opportunistic behaviour by 
DC plan members or portfolio managers could be mitigated by sound regulation of 
workers’ options and pension fund investments. 
MANAGEMENT OF THE GUARANTEE FUND.  Specific problems concerning the 
government guarantee fund could arise from the management of the financial assets 
portfolio. A solution could be to entrust the management to specialized intermediaries, 
appointed under transparent and competitive procedures. The investment objective 
could be a long-term return at least equal to that on government securities (or the rate 
guaranteed with the swap), plus a spread of one or two percentage points in order to 
recoup the net outlays entailed in the swap. Voting rights at the meetings of 
shareholders of listed companies should be adequately regulated. In brief, the 
guarantee fund should put in place governance mechanisms and investment controls 
to ensure sound management and better insulate both governance and asset 
management from undue political influence. A way to achieve this would be to follow 
the international best practices that have been identified by the OECD and other 
bodies for public pension reserve funds (Yermo, 2008). 
8.  An assessment of the premium payable by the pension scheme members 
The final amount to which the member is entitled at the time of retirement 
(equation 1) can be rewritten as: 
  0 , max T T T T A G A W    .       (5)   21
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (5) is the payment 
generated by a put option whose strike price is  T G . Consequently, at retirement the 
worker is entitled to the amount accumulated with the pension fund ( T A ), 
supplemented by the payment generated by the put option. In each year t the worker 
holds the portfolio of financial assets accumulated with the pension fund up to that 
time ( t A ) and the European put option offered to him by the government. Denoting 
the value of the option at time t by  t f , the total value of the position accrued by the 
member at that date is: 
t t t f A W   .            ( 6 )  
Option value theory makes it possible to determine the price  t f  of this option. Table 2 
shows the results obtained with this purely financial approach.
27 To take proper 
account of the possibility of large drops in share prices, these are assumed to follow a 
jump-diffusion process. Moreover, the parameters of the process, which we take from 
Di Cesare (2005), are inferred from option prices over a period of high stock market 
volatility.
28 In this way we guard against the risk of underestimating the costs of the 
nominal GDP guarantee. The cost estimates shown in Table 2 should provide an 
upper bound on the market value of the guarantee, based on historical data on option 
prices. 
Three different types of guarantee are considered in the simulations: two of 
them guarantee the repayment of the contributions paid in, in nominal and real terms 
(minimum rates of return of 0 and 2.5 percent respectively).
29 The third type of 
guarantee is that discussed in Section 4, in which the minimum rate of return of the 
pension fund is not predetermined but put equal to the nominal GDP growth rate in 
each year.
30 As regards the riskiness of the portfolio, four investment strategies are 
considered: (i) 100% equities; (ii) 50% equities and 50% government securities; (iii) 
100% government securities; and (iv) a simple life-cycle strategy, under which the 
portfolio is initially invested 100% in equities and then, in the last ten years of the 
accumulation period, gradually shifts, on a linear basis, into government securities 
                                                 
27  The fair value of the option is based on risk-neutral valuation. The methodology, and the 
underlying hypotheses, are presented in Appendix B. The solution can be obtained numerically, as the 
use of closed formulas à la Black and Scholes is hindered by the presence of periodic investments (see, 
for example, Zurita, 1994, and Pennacchi, 1999). For a thorough analysis of the main determinants of 
the cost of guaranteeing a minimum rate of return for a pension fund, see Lachance and Mitchell 
(2003a, 2003b). 
28  The jump-diffusion process is driven by three parameters: continuous volatility, the expected 
number of jumps per year, and the average jump size (see Appendix B). They are based on the prices of 
the options on S&P 500 futures contracts listed on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Di Cesare, 
2005). The estimation period runs from August 2000 to July 2002 and is characterized by quite high 
share price volatility, associated with the collapse of the high-tech bubble, a recession, 9/11, and 
accounting frauds. 
29  In regimes of low inflation a rate of return of 2.5 percent is sufficient to ensure repayment of the 
principal in real terms. 
30  It is important to note that, owing to the assumption of risk neutral valuation required to determine 
the price of the option, for all the risky assets, including nominal GDP, the rate of return expected by 
investors coincides with the risk-free interest rate. This means that no assumption is ever made in the 
simulations regarding the equity premium, the term premium or expected nominal GDP growth. On the 
other hand, the assumptions regarding the volatilities of the various stochastic processes considered and 
their correlations are of crucial importance.   22
Table 2 
Cost Estimates of Minimum Return Guarantees for Defined Contribution Pension Schemes (1) 
Panel (a): annual charges as a percentage of total assets 
Years with Individual Account    Minimum Rate of Return   
   0  percent 
(i.e. return of the principal) 
2.5 percent 
(i.e. about long-run inflation) 
Yearly nominal GDP growth rate (2) 
    I. Portfolio invested 100% in equities   
        with jumps (3)  without jumps (3) 
10   1.47  2.39  3.04 2.57 
20   0.68  1.46  2.14 1.82 
30   0.41  1.07  1.77 1.48 
40   0.26  0.83  1.54 1.27 
    II. Portfolio invested 50% in equities and 50% in 10-year Treasury bonds   
10   0.35  0.97  1.54   
20   0.11  0.54  1.13   
30   0.05  0.37  0.95   
40   0.02  0.26  0.81   
    III. Portfolio invested 100% in 10-year Treasury bonds   
10   0.00  0.00  0.44   
20   0.00  0.00  0.32   
30   0.00  0.00  0.27   
40   0.00  0.00  0.23   
    IV. Life-cycle investing (4)   
10   0.08  0.52  0.93   
20   0.09  0.56  1.24   
30   0.10  0.59  1.22   
40   0.03  0.34  1.20   
Source: Authors’ calculations (see Appendix B). 
(1) Estimate of the cost of a European put option with the maturity shown in the first column. Estimates are based on Monte Carlo simulations (10,000 trials) and are 
carried out for four different portfolios. As for the definition of minimum return, three different formulas are considered: two fixed-rate guarantees (0 and 2.5 percent per 
annum) and a guarantee yielding the nominal GDP growth rate each year. The methodology and underlying hypotheses are presented in Appendix B. - (2) The volatility 
of the nominal GDP growth rate is set equal to 2 percent per annum; the correlation between the GDP growth rate and stock returns is set equal to 0.4. – (3) For the case 
of a nominal GDP guarantee on a portfolio invested all in equity, the table also shows the cost of the guarantee if share prices do not follow a jump process. – (4) The 
portfolio is initially invested in equities and then linearly switches into bonds in the 10 years prior to retirement.   23
Table 2 (cont.) 
Cost Estimates of Minimum Return Guarantees for Defined Contribution Pension Schemes (1) 
Panel (b): annual charges as a percentage of lifetime contributions 
Years with Individual Account    Minimum Rate of Return   
   0  percent 
(i.e. return of the principal) 
2.5 percent 
(i.e. about long-run inflation) 
Yearly nominal 
GDP growth rate (2) 
    I. Portfolio invested 100% in equities   
10   11.40  18.48  23.49   
20   9.04  19.25  28.30   
30   7.69  19.98  33.12   
40   6.39  20.05  37.17   
    II. Portfolio invested 50% in equities and 50% in 10-year Treasury bonds   
10   2.68  7.42  11.81   
20   1.45  7.12  14.74   
30   0.84  6.83  17.45   
40   0.48  6.22  19.27   
    III. Portfolio invested 100% in 10-year Treasury bonds   
10   0.00  0.00  3.33   
20   0.00  0.00  4.12   
30   0.00  0.00  4.89   
40   0.00  0.00  5.53   
    IV. Life-cycle investing (3)   
10   1.89  12.37  28.71   
20   1.77  10.40  22.85   
30   1.34  7.76  16.26   
40   0.22  2.65  7.16   
Source: Authors’ calculations (see Appendix B). 
(1) Estimate of the cost of a European put option with the maturity shown in the first column. Estimates are based on Monte Carlo simulations (10,000 trials) and are 
carried out for four different portfolios. As for the definition of minimum return, three different formulas are considered: two fixed-rate guarantees (0 and 2.5 percent per 
annum) and a guarantee yielding the nominal GDP growth rate each year. The methodology and underlying hypotheses are presented in Appendix B. - (2) The volatility 
of the nominal GDP growth rate is set equal to 2 percent per annum; the correlation between the GDP growth rate and stock returns is set equal to 0.4. – (3) The portfolio 
is initially invested in equities and then linearly switches into bonds in the 10 years prior to retirement.   24
until, at the time of retirement, the equity share is nil.
31 Lastly, four different 
investment durations are considered (10, 20, 30 and 40 years). GDP volatility is taken 
to be 2 percent, while the correlation between GDP and the pension fund portfolio is 
assumed to be 0.4.
32 The cost of the option is calculated on an annual basis and both 
as a percentage of the assets under management (Panel a of Table 2) and as a 
percentage of lifetime contributions (Panel b). The second measure provides an 
indication of the affordability of the guarantee, in terms of its incidence on DC plan 
members’ disposable income. 
The estimates show that the type of guarantee provided has a substantial effect 
on the cost of the option. If we consider a 40-year accumulation period and a balanced 
portfolio divided equally between equities and 10-year government bonds, the cost of 
the option is very low if the option guarantees only the repayment of the contributions 
paid in; it rises to 0.26 percent of assets under management (6.22 percent of 
contributions) when the option guarantees an annual nominal rate of return of 2.5 
percent and 0.81 percent (19.27 percent) when it guarantees the nominal GDP growth 
rate. 
Another factor that has a considerable influence on the cost of the option 
(measured in terms of assets or contributions) is the volatility of the portfolio. If the 
portfolio is fully invested in equities, even just guaranteeing repayment of the 
contributions paid in requires, over a 40-year time horizon, an annual premium equal 
to 0.26 percent of the assets under management, which rises to 1.54 percent if the 
strike price of the option is linked to the GDP growth rate (6.39 and 37.17 percent, 
respectively, in terms of contributions). Conversely, the cost of the option falls 
drastically if the percentage of equities in the portfolio is reduced to zero; it is nil in 
the case of repayment of the capital paid in (in nominal and real terms), and even 
where the amount guaranteed is linked to the nominal GDP growth rate it is still 
barely above 0.20 percent of total assets (5.53 percent of contributions). A life-cycle 
strategy tends to be less expensive (in terms of total assets) than the balanced strategy 
(50% equities and 50% securities) for the 10-year maturity and more expensive for the 
longer durations (because of the larger weight of the period in which the portfolio is 
fully invested in equities).  
The presence of jumps in share prices implies quite a sizable increase in the 
cost of the guarantee, although its incidence tends to diminish as the accumulation 
period lengthens. This is shown in the last column of Table 2.a. For a portfolio fully 
invested in equities, the annual surcharge due to expected jumps in share prices is 
about 0.4 percent of assets under management for a 10-year time horizon and 0.2 
percent for longer horizons. 
Another variable that has a significant influence on the value of the guarantee 
is the duration of the accumulation period. If costs are measured as a percentage of 
assets under management, the option becomes less expensive as the investment 
horizon lengthens; the relation is markedly non-linear for relatively short retirement 
                                                 
31  The example of life-cycle investing is taken from Blake, Cairns and Dowd (2008). 
32  The historical data on nominal GDP provide estimates of its volatility that are very low. On the 
basis of quarterly data for the United States covering the period from 1988:Q1 to 2008:Q4, it can be 
estimated that the volatility of nominal GDP is of the order of 1 percent on an annual basis. The 
correlation between nominal GDP and the S&P 500 index (with dividends reinvested) would not 
exceed 0.4.   25
investment horizons.
33 This negative correlation with the investment horizon does not 
generally hold if costs are expressed as a share of contributions, because this cost 
measure does not take into account the growth of assets due to the proceeds of the 
investment portfolio. However, if the guaranteed minimum return is considerably 
lower than the rate of growth of earnings, the fact that the guarantee becomes less 
generous over time may dominate the volatility effect and the guarantee cost may fall 
over time.
34 In Table 2.b, this holds for the guarantee of repayment of the 
contributions paid in in nominal terms and for the 2.5 percent flat rate guarantee on 
the balanced portfolio. 
As for the guarantee linked to the nominal GDP growth rate, an important 
property that needs to be highlighted is that the amount insured (i.e.,  T G  the strike 
price of the put option in equation 5) is itself a random variable, because it depends on 
the performance of GDP. This risk factor is an additional source of volatility of the 
derivative contract and as such should increase the value of the option. However, it 
can also reduce its value if the risk factor shows a significant positive correlation with 
the portfolio. It is therefore important to assess the sensitivity of the price of the 
option both to the volatility of GDP and to the latter’s correlation with the portfolio. 
The estimates are shown in Table 3.
35 The simulations assume a balanced portfolio 
divided equally between equities and government securities, with a volatility on the 
order of 10.5 percent.
36 For the volatility of nominal GDP the values considered are 
between 1 and 10 percent, while for the correlation between nominal GDP and the 
portfolio, it is assumed to be positive and capable of taking on values ranging from 
0.2 to 0.99 (almost perfect correlation). 
The simulations show that a higher correlation between the value of the 
pension fund and that of GDP reduces the value of the option, both because it 
decreases the portion of cases in which the guarantee is triggered (i.e. in which the 
option gives rise to positive payoffs) and because it diminishes the size of the payoffs. 
The effect of the correlation depends, however, on the level of volatility of the two 
stochastic processes and, under standard assumptions regarding the volatility of GDP, 
it is relatively small. For example, an increase in the correlation from 0.4 to 0.6 
reduces the value of the option by between 0.05 and 0.12 percent if the volatility of 
GDP is 4 percent and by between 0.10 and 0.23 percent if it is 6 percent. 
As for the effect of an increase in the volatility of GDP on the value of the 
option, it is not unambiguous because it depends on the degree of correlation between 
GDP and the portfolio of the pension fund. An increase in the volatility of GDP has 
two effects of opposite sign: it amplifies the correlation effect referred to above, 
which lowers the value of the option, and has a direct effect on the overall volatility of 
the option, which increases the value of the derivative contract. As long as the 
volatility of GDP is relatively low, an increase in it will have little impact on the 
overall volatility of the option, while it strengthens the effect, of the opposite sign, of
                                                 
33  See also Figure 4 in Cesari, Grande and Panetta (2008), in relation to a guarantee of repayment of 
the contributions paid in. 
34  See a related discussion in Lachance and Mitchell (2003a). See also Bodie (1995, 2008). 
35  For the derivation of these effects in closed form, under the simplifying hypotheses that there is a 
single contribution to the pension fund at the beginning of the accumulation period and that the share 
prices follow a Brownian geometric motion without jumps, see Appendix B. 
36  As a result of standard assumptions on the volatilities of stock returns and short-term interest rates. 
See Appendix B.   26
Table 3 
Cost estimates of minimum return guarantees: 
sensitivity to different assumptions on GDP volatility (1) 
(annual charges as a percentage of total assets) 
  Correlation between nominal GDP and pension fund assets  Volatility of 
nominal GDP   
(%)  
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8  0.99
   10  years 
1   1.38  1.32 1.25 1.24  1.21
2   1.36  1.29 1.24 1.15  1.11
4   1.39 1.26 1.14 0.99 0.84
6   1.43  1.31 1.08 0.87 0.59
8   1.58  1.36 1.14 0.85 0.38
10   1.76  1.52 1.26 0.89 0.28
   20  years 
1   1.00  0.94 0.91 0.91  0.90
2   0.95  0.94 0.90 0.85  0.79
4   0.99 0.89 0.82 0.73 0.61
6   1.05  0.95 0.80 0.64 0.42
8   1.13  0.99 0.81 0.61 0.27
10   1.27  1.06 0.91 0.65 0.21
   30  years 
1   0.81  0.78 0.77 0.74  0.74
2   0.78  0.76 0.74 0.70  0.65
4   0.81 0.75 0.66 0.60 0.49
6   0.86  0.77 0.65 0.52 0.36
8   0.90  0.82 0.68 0.50 0.22
10   1.04  0.89 0.74 0.52 0.17
   40  years 
1   0.71  0.69 0.68 0.64  0.64
2   0.69  0.66 0.64 0.61  0.57
4   0.69 0.65 0.60 0.51 0.43
6   0.76  0.67 0.57 0.46 0.31
8   0.80  0.71 0.59 0.44 0.20
10   0.91  0.78 0.64 0.45 0.15
Source: Authors’ calculations (see Appendix B). 
(1) Estimate of the cost of a European put option with a strike price linked to the yearly nominal 
GDP growth rate. The estimates are carried out for a number of combinations of GDP volatility and 
GDP-pension fund asset correlations, as well as for four different investment horizons (10, 20, 30 
and 40 years). Risk-neutral valuation is assumed. The pension fund portfolio is evenly split between 
stocks and 10-year Treasury bonds and its volatility is equal to about 10.5 percent per annum. The 
estimates are based on Monte Carlo simulations (10,000 trials). For simplicity, share prices are 
assumed to follow a Brownian geometric motion without jumps. The methodology and the other 
underlying hypotheses are presented in Appendix B. The shaded areas show the combinations of 
GDP volatility/correlation for which, according to the pricing model in Margrabe (1978), in the case 
of a single contribution paid into the pension fund an increase in GDP volatility would lead to a rise 
in the value of the option (see Appendix C). 
the correlation. Beyond a certain threshold, the direct effect exceeds the correlation 
effect and a further increase in the volatility of GDP produces an increase in the value 
of the option.   27
It is important to also highlight that the cost estimates reported in Table 2 
assume that the guarantee’s cash flows can be exactly replicated by trading financial 
assets. This is a restrictive assumption, as GDP-linked securities usually are not 
available and financial markets are likely to provide only an imperfect hedge against 
fluctuations of aggregate economic activity.
37 An assessment of how much the fair 
value of the option is affected by the lack of GDP-linked securities can be carried out 
under the hypothesis that the residual GDP risk (i.e. the risk that cannot be hedged by 
traded assets) is not priced by financial markets. Some estimates indicate that the 
costs of the nominal GDP guarantee might be slightly above the level shown in the 
last column of Table 2 (of about 0.1 percentage points).
38 
Overall, these simulations indicate that, if a purely financial approach is 
adopted (assuming risk-neutral valuation), then the cost of guaranteeing a minimum 
rate of return equal to the nominal GDP growth rate may be significant if the portfolio 
mostly include equities, even in the case of investment horizons stretching over 
decades. 
However, for any given type of guarantee, the cost of the guarantee may be 
limited by introducing restrictions on portfolio risk, in the form, say, of limits on the 
amount invested in equities held (possibly applied in particular to the years preceding 
retirement). Alternatively, for any given level of portfolio risk, the cost of the 
guarantee may be lowered by reducing the guaranteed amount, by, for instance, 
ensuring the return of the principal only (in nominal or real terms). 
9.  Why should the guarantee be provided by the government? 
The option pricing approach used in Section 8 gives an estimate of the market 
value of the guarantee, i.e. of the marginal cost that investors would charge the 
government to take over its commitments (see Pennacchi, 2002). This price can be 
determined under the hypotheses of complete markets (i.e. the assets traded can 
replicate the payoffs of the option) and no arbitrage opportunities (i.e., assets are 
traded continuously and there is no “free lunch”). In this framework, considering the 
nominal GDP guarantee, the guarantor (public or private) would always be able to 
hedge its exposure to it perfectly by trading the underlying securities. For example, if 
the insured portfolio were fully invested in a share price index, the guarantor could 
hedge by selling the index short and buying the nominal GDP index, so that when the 
                                                 
37  While the macro markets posited by Shiller (1995) are meant to overcome the difficulties faced by 
capital markets in hedging aggregate income risks, Kamstra and Shiller (2009) make the case for 
government issues of securities with coupons tied to nominal GDP. See the discussion in the next 
section. For estimates of bounds on prices of non-traded assets, see Cochrane and Saá-Requejo (2000) 
and Kaido and White (2009). 
38  The methodology has two stages (see Pennacchi 1999, 2002): (i) first, estimate the difference 
between the expected growth rate of GDP and the equilibrium expected return of a hypothetical 
security that has the same volatility of GDP; (ii) when running Monte Carlo simulations, in the drift of 
the GDP process add that difference to the risk-free rate. In the estimates, the expected GDP growth 
rate is set equal to its annual average. The expected return on a hypothetical GDP-linked security is 
estimated through an asset pricing model including three factors (stock market returns, 10-year 
Treasury bond yields and consumer price inflation). Estimates are carried out recursively on annual 
data from 1980-2006 to 1991-2006 and, in each iteration, the difference between the sample average of 
the GDP growth rate and the expected return is computed. The average value of this difference is then 
used in Monte Carlo simulations, as explained above.   28
economy outperforms the stock market the gain generated by the hedge portfolio will 
offset the increase in the contingent liability. 
One might suggest that instead of providing insurance itself the government 
could promote private provision of GDP-linked minimum return guarantees by 
issuing GDP-linked bonds. In this way the government would significantly reduce 
hedging costs and make it easier for the guarantors to transfer the risk of the guarantee 
to individuals or institutions that are willing to bear it. But the cost estimates in 
Section 8 already assume that nominal GDP is a traded asset, which means that even 
if new markets for securities with coupons tied to nominal GDP were to develop, the 
estimated fair values of GDP-linked minimum return guarantees would not be likely 
to diminish, unless the new debt instruments significantly increased the correlation 
between asset returns and GDP growth or reduced their volatilities. 
In addition to stimulating the supply of GDP-linked guarantees, such securities 
would enable pension funds to offer investment lines benchmarked to nominal GDP.
39 
However, unlike the publicly guaranteed minimum return, a portfolio tracking 
nominal GDP would not allow workers to benefit when the financial markets are 
performing well. An alternative solution could be to require individuals to invest a 
certain share of their portfolio in GDP-linked bonds, which would undoubtedly be 
simpler to administer than a publicly guaranteed minimum return. However, the lower 
the compulsory share of nominal GDP bonds in the portfolio, the less effective the 
cover against extreme investment risks would be. Conversely, the higher the 
compulsory portfolio share of nominal GDP bonds, the lower the benefits of having 
individual funded schemes. 
The basic rationale for direct governmental provision of the guarantee is to 
guard against extreme financial market risks that are not otherwise insurable. In times 
of systemic shocks, private sector forces are not likely to be able to provide affordable 
insurance against massive investment risks, so government intervention to protect 
prospective retirees becomes necessary. 
It could be argued that, in such extraordinary circumstances, government can 
always step in to rescue retirees, especially when participation is not voluntary but 
compulsory. Public bailouts are indeed an option, provided they are limited to 
workers who are close to retirement and so will be unable to enjoy the eventual 
recovery in financial asset prices in the longer term. But rescues are necessarily an 
extreme remedy, because they are costly for taxpayers and may encourage future 
opportunistic behaviour by pension funds. For taxpayers a public guarantee scheme 
funded by risk-based premiums would be more efficient than ex-post bailouts, as the 
guarantee fund would distribute the burden evenly over time and different cohorts of 
workers. 
Another major factor hampering private provision of such minimum return 
guarantees is counterparty risk over long-term horizons. Any retirement-related 
guarantee entails a very long-term commitment. Under such arrangements, DC plan 
members may well lose confidence in the insurer’s ability to stay in the market long 
enough to fulfill its contractual obligations. The relative inability of market 
arrangements to offer credible long-term commitment – “market fragility” as Cooper 
                                                 
39  The case for the U.S. government to issue a new security with a coupon tied to current-dollar GDP 
has now been made by Kamstra and Shiller (2009), who call the new security a win-win solution, as it 
would benefit both the issuer (the government) and the investors.   29
and Ross (1999) called it – requires government to step in. Limits to what market 
forces may achieve also come from the demand side, due to moral hazard problems 
for the insured. Private financial intermediaries may not be confident about their 
ability to monitor the behavior of the insured over long-term horizons and may refrain 
from providing long-term guarantees. A government-backed insurance scheme might 
manage to reduce moral hazard through regulation and supervision. 
The very long-term horizon of a public guarantee fund has other advantages. 
As is explained in Sections 5 and 7, it allows exploitation of the tendency of asset 
prices to grow at least as fast as GDP in the long run. And together with government 
backing, the long-term horizon permits the fund to finance its net outlays through 
long-term bond issues at advantageous prices and to weather financial market 
liquidity crises. 
One more argument for direct government involvement is uncertainty over the 
probability distribution of future financial market returns. As Shiller (2006) stresses, 
the 21st century may differ fundamentally from the 20th. A public guarantee fund 
seems to be better suited to shoulder such uncertainty over long-term accumulation 
periods. 
Finally, it may also be argued that public guarantee fund’s propensity to take 
risks could be significantly higher than that of the average financial market 
participant, as it is likely to enjoy better risk-sharing opportunities. This in turn 




The blow to pension fund assets from the recent financial crisis has 
underscored how severely members of defined contribution schemes are exposed to 
financial market tail risks, i.e. to exceptionally large and exceptionally rare drops in 
financial asset prices that can drastically reduce their accumulated pension value. 
Market instruments and mutualistic mechanisms may be ineffective and in any case 
very costly means of protecting returns against these risks. Accordingly, it is worth 
considering the possible benefits of some form of government-guaranteed minimum 
return. The public sector’s long time horizon and nationwide sphere of action make 
government best placed to bear the consequences of a collapse in the prices of 
financial assets. Clearly, such a guarantee system must be structured so as to ensure 
public financial sustainability. 
In the proposal put forward in this article, the government would guarantee a 
minimum return to defined contribution pension scheme members. The guarantee 
would be compulsory but would offer several options on the level of the guaranteed 
return, ranging from nil (guaranteeing the restitution of contributions in nominal 
terms) to a return as high as the economy’s nominal growth rate. Such a scheme 
would ensure a return on workers’ contributions consistent with their risk preferences. 
In particular, if the guaranteed rate were linked to nominal GDP, the scheme would 
safeguard future pensioners during the accumulation period against inflation, real 
shocks to individual sectors of the economy, and a fall in living standards compared 
                                                 
40  For an analysis of the role of risk aversion in the pricing of rate-of-return guarantees for pension 
funds, see Munnell, Golub-Sass, Kopcke and Webb (2009).   30
with the rest of the population; workers would also be protected against 
macroeconomic risks that are otherwise hard to diversify and that could weigh down 
market returns for protracted periods. At the same time, the guarantee scheme would 
allow workers to continue to benefit when the net returns on their financial 
investments exceed the minimum return over the accumulation period. Finally, the 
guarantee would not require any significant alteration in the operation of 
supplementary defined contribution pension plans, particularly as regards the 
retirement saving vehicles of private intermediaries, the availability of different 
investment lines during the accumulation period, or methods of benefit disbursement. 
For the insurance scheme to be financially sustainable, workers must pay a 
risk-based premium. For it to be economically advantageous as well, the premiums 
should depend both on the level of the minimum return and on the percentage of risky 
securities in the portfolio. Government would in any case be able to charge lower 
premiums than any equivalent private insurance scheme. 
Government would manage the swaps through an ad hoc guarantee fund 
financed out of the reserves generated by workers’ premiums and possibly issues of 
government-backed securities. The guarantee fund would be financially sound, as it 
would be able to fund its activity at good prices and manage its reserves as a 
long-term investor. 
The existence of a safety net against stock market collapse could of course 
encourage members of defined contribution pension plans to hold excessively risky 
portfolios, as in the case of workers close to retirement who are dissatisfied with their 
returns. This risk of opportunistic behaviour can be averted, say by placing a limit on 
the proportion of risky securities in a portfolio as the date of pension entitlement 
approaches. Similarly, the investment choices of asset managers, as well as the 
governance of the public guarantee fund, should be adequately regulated. In any 
event, a government-guaranteed minimum return on pension funds would give 
workers additional incentive to join defined contribution plans and to increase their 
contribution rate. 
 
Appendix A: The data used in the estimates of guarantee fund’s maximum 
outlays  
The data used in Section 7 to estimate the maximum outlays of the guarantee 
fund in the United States and Japan are as follows: 
-  Annual number of workers who retire. It is calculated by dividing the annual 
number of residents aged 60-64 by five. Source: OECD.Stat Extracts, Labour 
Force Statistics by sex and age; 
-  Annual earnings. For the United States: annual mean income (in dollars) of 
full-time, year-round workers aged 60-64 (before 1993, it is estimated on the 
basis of the Social Security Actuary’s average wage index). Source: U.S. Census 
Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS) and Social Security Actuary. For 
Japan, hourly earnings index in manufacturing and real mean income of working 
age population (18-65 years). Source: OECD.Stat Extracts, Main Economic 
Indicators and Social and Welfare Statistics (Income distribution – Inequality); 
-  Contribution rate. Average (employee and employer) contribution rate to 401(k) 
plans for workers in their sixties in 1999: 12 percent. This is the average   31
percentage of salary contributed, by employer and employee together, to 401(k) 
plans in the United States in 1999 for workers in their sixties. Average 
contribution rates for other age brackets or for plans that do not have employer 
contributions are much lower (see Table 4 in Holden and VanDerhei, 2001); 
-  Gross domestic product in billions of domestic currency. U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and OECD; 
-  Total return stock market index. Shiller (2005) for the United States and Topix 
Index for Japan (source: Thomson Datastream); 
-  Interest rates. Yield to maturity of 10-year government bond benchmarks (source: 
Thomson Datastream). 
Appendix B: The method of estimating the option value 
The method for calculating the value of the put option of a DC plan member is 
based on risk-neutral valuation (see, for example, sections 11.6 and 16.6 in Hull, 
2000) and basically follows Cox and Ross (1976), Merton, Bodie and Marcus (1987), 
Zurita (1994), Pennacchi (1999), Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001) and Lachance and 
Mitchell (2003a, 2003b). In order to better model the probability of large changes in 
stock market indices, share prices are assumed to have jumps superimposed upon a 
geometric Brownian motion (Merton, 1976). 
For comparison with previous studies, the parameter assumptions are similar 
to those of Lachance and Mitchell (2003a, 2003b). The starting level of annual 
earnings is set equal to 41,335 US dollars, which corresponds to the Social Security 
Actuary’s average wage index for 2008. The rate of growth of annual earnings is 
assumed to be 4 percent, while the percentage contribution rate is set equal to 12 
percent (see Appendix A). For the risk-free rate, the estimate follows the model in 
Vasicek (1977). The initial value of the rate, its stationary value, the adjustment factor 
and the rate volatility are set at 2 percent, 4 percent, 80 percent and 2 percent 
respectively. The returns on 10-year bonds are estimated with the closed-form model 
calculated by Vasicek (1977). Share returns in continuous time follow a jump 
diffusion model in which (assuming risk neutral valuation) the drift is set equal to the 
risk-free rate adjusted for the average growth rate from the jumps. The discrete time 
version of the process is: 
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where   t S  and    t r  are, respectively,  the share price index and the risk-free interest 
rate at time t,   is the volatility when a jump does not occur,   is the rate at which 
jumps happen,   is the average jump size measured as a proportional increase in the 
share price index,   is a random sample from a normal distribution with mean zero 
and standard deviation of 1.0 and n is a random sample from a Poisson distribution 
with an average number of expected jumps per unit of time equal to  . The processes 
  and n are assumed to be independent. 
The parameters of the stochastic process for share returns are taken from Di 
Cesare (2005) and are estimated from the prices of the options on S&P 500 futures 
contracts listed on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange over the period August 2000-  32
July 2002. The volatility when a jump does not occur is set equal to 16 percent, the 
expected number of jumps per year is 1.8 and the average jump size is -12.8 percent 
(that is, the stock market index falls by almost 13 percent). 
In the simulations presented in Table 3 the assumptions are the same as in 
Table 2 except that share prices follow a geometric Brownian motion without jumps 
and have a volatility of 20 percent. Nominal GDP is assumed to follow a Brownian 
geometric motion, with different values for volatility and correlation with share 
returns. 
The final amounts of the notional fund and the pension fund are calculated on 
the basis of (2) and (3), respectively; the payment generated by the option at the time 
of retirement is then calculated on the basis of (4). This calculation is made for each 
of the 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations. The average value of the payments generated 
by the option in all the simulations is then calculated, and finally its present value 
assuming risk neutrality is determined. The value obtained is expressed as a 
percentage of the present value (also calculated assuming risk neutrality) of annual 
contributions or assets under management. 
Appendix C: The value of the option with a lump-sum investment 
It is much easier to calculate the value of the option if we posit a single 
investment in the pension fund; on this basis, a closed-form calculation is possible. 
Let us consider this case under the further simplifying assumption that share prices 
follow a Brownian geometric motion without jumps. The minimum return guarantee 
linked to the nominal GDP growth rate, which is described in Section 4, corresponds 
to an option in which one risky asset (the amount accumulated in the pension fund) is 
swapped with another (the notional fund). This derivative contract, sometimes known 
as an exchange option, was studied for the first time by Margrabe (1978). It represents 
a more general case of the classic option à la Black-Scholes-Merton, since the strike 
price is itself a stochastic variable.
41 Assuming the pension fund member makes a 
single lump-sum payment (represented by  0 A ) at the beginning of the accumulation 
period, and taking into account that the initial value of the notional fund ( 0 G ) is the 
same as that of the pension fund, the value of the option at the beginning of the 
accumulation period ( 0 f ) is given by the following formula: 
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and where   x N  is the probability of a standard normal random variable being smaller 
than  x, while  ˆ , 
2
A  , 
2
G   and  AG   are, respectively, the overall volatility of the 
                                                 
41 See also Hull (2000), Chapter 18.   33
payments generated by the option, the volatility of the pension fund, the volatility of 
the notional fund, and the correlation between the two stochastic variables. 
In equations (C.1-C.4) the price of the option is evidently a function of the 
overall volatility  ˆ , and therefore of the volatility of the two underlying stochastic 
processes (the pension fund portfolio and nominal GDP) and their correlation. It also 
obviously reflects the initial value of the insured capital and the duration of the 
contract. 
Given (C.4), the effect of the correlation  AG   on total volatility  ˆ  is 
monotonic and negative. In fact, it depends on the following condition: 
0 2         0
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which always holds. The effect of the correlation on  ˆ  is annulled if the exercise 
price of the option is not stochastic ( 0  G  ), which is the standard Black-Scholes-
Merton case. 
On the other hand, the effect of the volatility of the strike price ( G  ) on total 
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where in (C.5) it is also taken into account that the correlation cannot be greater than 
1. Since in the simulations  105 . 0  A  , (C.5) implies that 
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(where the last inequality holds with a degree of approximation). Finally, in the 
extreme case of perfect positive correlation between the value of the portfolio and the 
option strike price ( 1  AG  ), total volatility  ˆ  is equal to: 
G A      ˆ            ( C . 6 )  
and the price of the option is led by the differential between the two volatilities. The 
value of the exchange option is annulled if two stochastic processes with perfect 
positive correlation also have the same volatility. 
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